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MARC – Mergers & Acquisitions Research Centre 
MARC is the Mergers and Acquisitions Research Centre at Cass Business School, City 
University London – the first research centre at a major business school to pursue focussed 
leading-edge research into the global mergers and acquisitions industry. 
MARC blends the expertise of M&A accountants, bankers, lawyers, consultants and other key 
market participants with the academic excellence of Cass to provide fresh insights into the 
world of deal-making. 
Corporations, regulators, professional services firms, exchanges and universities use MARC 
for swift access to research and practical ideas. From deal origination to closing, from financing 
to integration, from the hottest emerging markets to the board rooms of the biggest 
corporations, MARC researches the wide spectrum of mergers, acquisitions and corporate 
restructurings. 
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Overview 
or decades, corporate managers have 
criticised analysts, fund managers, 
hedge fund managers and private equity 
professionals for telling them how to run their 
business, wihout having had the necessary 
experience. Now hedge fund activists are 
regularly suggesting operational decisions, and 
in some cases even in areas traditionally 
reserved for management. ‘Activism has gone 
from being frowned upon, something that marks 
you out as a rogue or maverick, to almost 
socially responsible.’1 These hedge funds may 
have become an accepted part of the 
governance universe but are they actually 
adding value? 
Recent studies have answered this question in 
the affirmative, but what if those companies 
picked out by hedge funds for their attention 
were already on their way to outperformance? 
The observed outperformance may not be due 
to a hedge fund’s ability to contribute to value 
creation but a mere reflection of their stock 
picking abilities. The difficulty is in identifying 
those companies that would have made typical 
hedge fund targets but which were not actually 
targeted, i.e. build an appropriate group of 
comparable companies. We have developed a 
statistical model to identify just these 
companies.  
 Hedge fund targets are the ‘usual 
suspects’. Our model reveals that these 
companies have depressed valuations and 
have underperformed their peers. Size also 
matters as smaller companies are more 
likely to be targeted. Low dividend yield, 
leverage and insider ownership may also 
put you on the hedge fund radar. Stock 
liquidity is also important as hedge fund 
activists need to accumulate the critical 
level of ownership that will make their voice 
heard. 
 It ’s all about who you compare 
yourself to. When we measure company 
                                                          
1 Ken Square, founder of activism database 13D 
Monitor. 
performance following hedge fund activism 
involvement, using the traditional 
performance benchmarks, we confirm the 
results from earlier studies. However, when 
we compare the performance of hedge fund 
targets to companies that resemble these 
targets but were never actually targeted, 
the story changes. Most of the hedge fund 
targets either significantly underperform 
similar non target firms or generate returns 
which are not significantly different from the 
comparable group. Overall, we find that 
Completed hedge fund targets 
underperform similar non target firms by 
15% during the two-year period following 
intervention.2 
 Stock pickers not managers. Our 
results suggest that the shareholder wealth 
improvement experienced by the targets of 
hedge fund activism (that is documented by 
previous studies) is not caused by the 
hedge fund intervention per se. Instead, it 
merely demonstrates the activists’ ability to 
choose companies whose shareholder 
wealth is expected to improve in any event. 
The observed wealth creation is evidence 
of the hedge fund’s ‘stock picking’ skills 
rather than their ability to contribute to long-
term value creation by inducing companies 
to implement proposed changes.  
 Recommendations. Corporates should 
adopt a proactive strategy to dealing with 
activists. This could involve regular 
discussions at the board level of the risk of 
being targeted by an activist in order to 
raise awareness. Policymakers should 
consider the fact that activist interventions 
could be detrimental to shareholder wealth 
when defining the ‘rules of engagement’ 
between companies and hedge fund 
activists. And activists should stick to stock 
picking and avoid operational 
management.  
2 Please refer to the methodology section for a 
definition of Completed hedge fund engagements. 
F        
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Background 
edge funds are arguably the most 
controversial investors in the financial 
universe, having been referred to as 
short term speculators, vultures or ‘locusts’. 
Thankfully, the reality is less one-sided. In 
particular, hedge fund activism is a fertile 
ground for research with findings on both sides 
of the argument. 
The central question 
Recent studies show that hedge fund activism 
can have a positive impact on subsequent 
company performance.3 While these studies 
examine value creation following a campaign 
they do not address the issue of which firms 
become targets in the first place, i.e. they do not 
have a model to ‘predict’ potential targets. A 
related and equally important issue neglected 
by these studies is that in their analyses they 
benchmark company value gains following 
hedge fund involvement against traditional 
measures of performance such as industry and 
index adjusted share price returns or change in 
accounting measures of performance such as 
ROA. These types of benchmarks are flawed 
and not completely reliable as they do not 
control for the bias which arises from the fact 
that hedge funds select for targets those firms 
that are most likely to respond to their campaign 
and thereby generate value. The resulting value 
gains reported by earlier studies may not be 
due to the hedge fund intervention at all but due 
to the inherent characteristics of the targets 
selected by these hedge funds. This does not 
mean that the undervalued or underperforming 
targets would have achieved value 
enhancement by doing nothing, i.e. avoiding 
the changes that the hedge funds would have 
imposed on them. It merely means that the 
managers of the potential target firms might 
have done all the changes even absent being 
in the hedge funds’ cross-hairs. Since prior 
studies do not distinguish the value outcomes 
in the presence of hedge funds from the value 
outcomes that would have been achieved in the 
absence of hedge funds, the value gains that 
these studies report cannot be unambiguously 
attributed to hedge funds alone. 
Our approach 
It is therefore necessary to adopt a more 
accurate methodology to correct for the 
presence of such biases. Performance 
measurement bias is an issue since hedge fund 
targets are not randomly selected, i.e., the very 
characteristics that make companies attractive 
targets to activist investors could also be the 
factors that cause the improvement in 
subsequent performance. We seek to answer 
the following question: Would the target 
company’s performance have improved without 
the hedge fund’s involvement? We use an 
advanced econometric methodology to answer 
this question. If the process of target selection 
for hedge fund activism depends on a group of 
observable company characteristics, the true 
performance effect can be evaluated by 
building a control sample of non-target 
companies and then by averaging the 
differences in performance that take place 
between the target and non-target subsamples.  
 
 
                                                          
3 Bebchuk, L., A. Brav and Wei, J., ‘The Long-term 
Effects of Hedge Fund Activism’, Columbia Law 
Review, Vol. 115, 2015, pp. 1085-1156; Becht, M., J. 
Franks, J. Grant and Wagner, H., ‘The Returns to 
Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study’, CERP 
Discussion Paper No. 10507, 2015; Brav, A., W. 
Jiang, F. Partnoy, and Thomas, R., ‘Hedge Fund 
Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm 
Performance’, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 63, 2008, 
pp. 1729-1775; Hamao, Y., K. Kutsuna and Matos, 
P., ‘Investor Activism in Japan: The First 10 Years’, 
Center on Japanese Economy and Business 
Working Paper Series, No. 289, 2010; Greenwood, 
R., and Schor, M., ‘Investor Activism and Takeovers’, 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 92, 2009, pp. 
362-375. 
H 
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An Evolving View
Shareholder proposals 
The impact of shareholder activism on firm 
value has been the subject of academic 
investigation for over 30 years now. The profile 
of activists has changed significantly over time. 
First it was the corporate raiders in the 1980s 
undertaking hostile and break-up takeovers in 
an attempt to discipline company management 
and directors. The regulatory changes of the 
1990s saw the rise of activist institutional 
investors by putting more power in the hands of 
shareholders and increasing their ability to 
express their views.  
Earlier studies of activism examined the effect 
of shareholder proposals on value creation. 
Such shareholder proposals tended to be of 
advisory nature only and were not often 
supported by a majority of company 
shareholders. In addition, there is evidence that 
these proposals tended to generate low or no 
value for shareholders. For example, a study of 
356 US shareholder proposals between 1987 
and 1993 shows that there is no evidence of 
significant positive abnormal short- and long-
term share price returns following the filing of 
these proposals.4 Another study of 146 
governance proposals filed by public pension 
funds between 1988 and 1994 reported 
significant negative wealth impact associated 
with the announcement of such proposals. The 
authors use industry and index benchmarks to 
measure abnormal returns.5 
 
                                                          
4 Wahal, S., ‘Pension Fund Activism and Firm 
Performance’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, Vol. 31, 1996, pp. 1-23. 
5 Prevost, A. and Rao, R., ‘Of What Value are 
Shareholder Proposals Sponsored by Public 
Pension Funds?’, Journal of Business, Vol. 73, 2000, 
pp. 177-204. 
6 Bebchuk, L., A. Brav and Wei, J., ‘The Long-term 
Effects of Hedge Fund Activism’, Columbia Law 
Review, Vol. 115, 2015, pp. 1085-1156. 
The resurgence of hedge fund activism 
More recently the activist arena has been 
dominated by a different type of activist 
investor, namely, hedge funds. The old 
perception of these activists as purely short 
term in time horizon has been rebutted by 
empirical evidence showing that hedge funds 
are more likely to take medium to long term 
positions in target companies and that through 
engagement with companies these activist 
investors can bring about value enhancing 
changes.6  
In addition, owing to the higher expenses 
associated with certain more impactful activist 
procedures, such as those involving a proxy 
fight, these procedures tend to be pursued 
primarily by hedge funds. The use of more 
effective activist tactics such as proxy votes can 
be considerably more costly than submitting a 
shareholder proposal.7 It is estimated that in the 
US the average public activist engagement 
through a proxy fight can result in $10 million in 
expenses, representing approximately two 
thirds of the total abnormal returns that the 
average campaign generates.8  
Activist hedge funds tend also to be much more 
specialised and their portfolios typically consist 
of 10 to 30 companies while the value of their 
positions tends to be relatively large.9 This 
approach differs significantly from that of other 
types of activist investors such as institutional 
investors who can hold hundreds or thousands 
of positions in different stocks.  
 
Becht, M., J. Franks, J. Grant and Wagner, H., ‘The 
Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International 
Study’, CERP Discussion Paper No. 10507, 2015.  
7 Gantchev, N., ‘The Costs of Shareholder Activism: 
Evidence from a Sequential Decision Model’, Journal 
of Financial Economics, Vol. 107, 2013, pp. 610-631. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Becht, M., J. Franks, J. Grant and Wagner, H., 
‘The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An 
International Study’, CERP Discussion Paper No. 
10507, 2015.  
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Evidence from US studies 
The most recent major study on the effect of US 
hedge fund activism was performed by 
Bebchuk et al. (2015).10 The study uses a 
sample of approximately 2,040 engagements 
announced between 1994 and 2007 to evaluate 
the long-term effects of hedge fund activism on 
company performance. The study measures 
the abnormal returns following the activist’s 
disposal of ownership in the target firm using a 
holding period starting one month after and 
ending 36 (or 60) months after the departure of 
the hedge fund. Expected returns are 
calculated using the Fama-French four factor 
model. The authors report average abnormal 
returns amounting to 7.17% (-0.29%). The 
authors conclude that there is little evidence to 
support the claim that activists hurt long-term 
performance through short-sighted “pump-and-
dump” trading methods. 
And outside the US… 
Similar to studies which focus on activism in the 
US, the recent literature on hedge fund activism 
outside the US demonstrates that activist 
investors can contribute to shareholder value 
creation. The most recent major study of hedge 
fund activism outside the US was performed by 
Becht et al. (2015).11 The study analyses an 
international sample of 1,740 activist 
involvements between 2000 and 2010 and finds 
that activist interventions with an outcome 
result in average abnormal returns of 8% while 
interventions without outcome result in 2.3% 
returns. The authors conclude that the 
involvement of hedge funds can lead to positive 
alpha but that the size of returns is contingent 
upon the activist achieving the desired outcome 
from the intervention. Becht et al. (2015) also 
show that the cumulative abnormal returns 
around outcome announcements can vary 
dramatically depending on the type of outcome 
that the hedge fund achieves. The study 
documents that, measured over a (-20, +20) 
day event window, interventions resulting in 
takeovers can generate 9.7% returns, other 
forms of restructuring can result in 5.6% 
returns, changes to boards can result in 4.5% 
returns, while changes to payout policies 
generate  
-0.2% returns. 
A significant drawback of studying activism is 
the inability, or considerable challenge, to 
measure the activism that takes place behind 
the scenes. While research can identify the 
number of 13D filings12 in a given year or 
shareholder proposals voted on at AGMs, it is 
thought that a significant proportion never make 
the news. The number of such engagements is 
estimated to be around 50% in Europe, 
although through its discussions with and 
studies of activist funds, Activist Insight 
estimates this number to be as high as 66%.13  
To sum up, most recent studies show that the 
involvement of activist investors can generate 
positive short and long-term shareholder 
returns. However, this evidence is based on 
measures of wealth creation that do not 
account for the fact that the targets of hedge 
fund activists are inherently different from non-
target firms. That is to say, the observed 
improvement in post engagement performance 
could be due to the fact that hedge fund targets 
are systematically different from non-targets 
and that the improvement in performance would 
have taken effect irrespective of the activist’s 
engagement. The very factors that attract 
hedge fund activists to certain companies may 
also be the factors that drive the observed 
increase in shareholder value creation following 
intervention. This is the focus of the rest of this 
report
                                                          
10 Bebchuk, L., A. Brav and Wei, J., ‘The Long-term 
Effects of Hedge Fund Activism’, Columbia Law 
Review, Vol. 115, 2015, pp. 1085-1156. 
11 Becht, M., J. Franks, J. Grant and Wagner, H., 
‘The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An 
International Study’, CERP Discussion Paper No. 
10507, 2015.  
12 This type of filings is a legal requirement for any 
investor who holds 5% or more of a firm’s shares 
and who intends to impact corporate control. 
13 Cristerna, H. and Ventresca, C., ‘Knocking on the 
door-Shareholder activism in Europe: Five things you 
need to know’, J.P. Morgan Research Paper Series, 
2014; Activist Insight (2015).  
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What Makes an Attractive Target for 
Shareholder Activism?
Most studies of hedge fund activism identify 
performance benchmarks based on industry 
and company size. We highlight the importance 
of selecting control firms based on more than 
two characteristics. We first identify a 
comprehensive group of control variables that 
will allow us to estimate accurately the 
probability of becoming a target of hedge fund 
activism. We then estimate two probability 
models to predict the likelihood of becoming a 
target. Figure 1 displays the results of the 
models. Model 1 is based on unadjusted 
financial characteristics and Model 2 is based 
on industry-adjusted financial characteristics. 
Please refer to the Appendices for an in-depth 
description of our methodology and detailed 
definitions of the variables used in our 
probability models.  
Our analysis shows that hedge funds are likely 
to target smaller companies since the larger the 
target, the larger the initial capital investment 
that is necessary in order to obtain a sizeable 
stock holding in the target that would allow the 
hedge fund to exert any meaningful influence.14 
Buying a significant stake in any large company 
could increase the exposure of the activist’s 
portfolio to idiosyncratic risk that is too large 
even for a hedge fund. We use the market 
capitalisation of companies measured one year 
before the announcement of the hedge fund 
involvement in order to account for the effect of 
company size.  
We also show that the targets of hedge fund 
activists are likely to be ‘value driven’, i.e. they 
tend to invest in companies with low market-to-
book ratios.15 Furthermore, our models indicate 
that the degree to which the hedge fund activist 
perceives a given company to be undervalued 
                                                          
14 Greenwood, R., and Schor, M., ‘Investor Activism 
and Takeovers’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 
92, 2009, pp. 362-375. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Brav, A., W. Jiang, F. Partnoy, and Thomas, R., 
‘Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and 
is an important determinant of activists’ choice 
to engage with a given company.16 We 
employed a number of different variables to 
measure a given company’s degree of 
perceived undervaluation, such as the ratio of 
price to free cash flow, the price earnings ratio, 
as well as the average upside to broker’s target 
prices. 
Among some of the main objectives of activist 
hedge funds are to improve the strategies and 
operations of target firms. As a result, we 
expect that the targets of activists are likely to 
have poor measures of operational 
performance.17 We account for this effect by 
including a measure of the annual sales growth 
of the target company during the three years 
before the announcement of the activist 
engagement. In addition, we include a measure 
of the firm profitability given by the return on 
capital employed (ROCE) as of one year before 
the intervention. Our models confirm this idea.  
Target firm capital structure is different from 
that of non-targets.18 When company leverage 
is relatively high, managers are less likely to 
undertake value destroying projects as the 
interest payments associated with high 
leverage would decrease the amount of free 
cash flow. Our analysis shows that hedge fund 
targets are likely to have low levels of leverage 
on their balance sheets. We control for this 
difference between targets and non-targets by 
including the ratio of net debt to market 
capitalisation in our probability model.  
Our models also demonstrate that target 
companies’ dividend payout is lower compared 
to their non-target peers as indicated by the 
lower dividend yield. Our models also account 
for the amount of capital companies invest for 
Firm Performance’, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 63, 
2008, pp. 1729-1775. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
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the purpose of organic growth. We use the 
ratios of capital expenditures to sales as well as 
research and development to sales in order to 
capture this effect. The analysis shows that 
these factors are not significant determinants of 
the likelihood of being targeted by an activist 
hedge fund.   
We also expect that target companies tend to 
have underperformed their industry in the years 
before the activist engagement. We measure 
the relative performance of companies by 
calculating the three-year growth in the total 
returns index for each company before the 
activist’s engagement. We also include a 
measure of the earning per share outcome for 
each company relative to analyst consensus 
estimates, this variable captures the degree of 
‘earnings surprise’ associated with the given 
company. A negative operational performance 
relative to market expectations would suggest 
that there is scope for operational 
improvements. Not surprisingly our models 
confirm this idea. 
We also show that high trading volume is crucial 
in order to allow the activists to accumulate the 
necessary number of shares in a short period of 
time. This is because the actions of some 
activists are followed by other investors and 
these other investors could drive up the cost of 
amassing the necessary ownership stake that 
would enable the activist to exert influence on 
company management. Stocks that are 
characterised with high trading volume make it 
easier for the activist to acquire a significant 
ownership position before other, tag-along 
investors. High trading volume also makes it 
easier for hedge funds to exit their position. We 
measure the trading liquidity as share volume 
divided by adjusted shares outstanding. 
Finally, we also account for the percentage of 
shares that are owned by company insiders. 
Our models indicate that the likelihood of being 
targeted is significantly lower, the higher the 
percentage of shares owned by company 
insiders. The larger the stake owned by 
company insiders the more difficult it is for the 
activist hedge fund to exert any influence on 
company management and achieve change.
Figure 1: Hedge Fund Target Characteristics 
Variable Name 
Model 1 
Unadjusted 
metrics 
Model 1 
Marginal 
Probabilities 
Model 2 
Industry 
adjusted 
metrics 
Model 2 
Marginal 
Probabilities 
Total return (3-year) -0.184*** -1.16% -0.154*** -0.98% 
Net debt to market cap -0.0662*** -0.42% -0.0409** -0.26% 
Return on capital employed -0.164 -1.03% -0.290** -1.84% 
Undervaluation -0.229*** -1.44% -0.363*** -2.31% 
Forward P/E ratio -0.00210** -0.01% -0.00178* -0.01% 
Earnings surprise -0.126*** -0.79% -0.110*** -0.70% 
Sales growth (3-year) -0.176*** -1.11% -0.158** -1.01% 
Capex to sales -0.154 -0.97% -0.134 -0.85% 
Dividend yield -0.112*** -0.71% -0.0991*** -0.63% 
Price to free cash flow 0.000257 0.002% 0.000293* 0.00% 
Market to book -0.0146* -0.09% -0.0102 -0.06% 
Cash to total assets 0.0366 0.23% -0.0612 -0.39% 
Market cap. -0.0763*** -0.48% -0.0836*** -0.53% 
R&D to sales 0.00761 0.05% -0.000665 -0.004% 
Closely Held Shares -0.983*** -6.19% -1.016*** -6.46% 
Share turnover 0.0391*** 0.25% 0.0435*** 0.28% 
Constant -1.004*** - -1.206*** - 
Activist Engagements 1,750  1,750  
Pseudo R2 0.095  0.092  
Figure 1 presents the probability regression models based on unadjusted financial characteristics (Model 1) and 
industry- adjusted characteristics (Model 2). Please refer to the Data and Methodology section for further details. 
For each variable we report the regression coefficient, the corresponding t-statistic and the marginal probability 
change induced by a one-standard deviation change in the values of the variables from their respective sample 
averages. *** refers to statistical significance at the 1% level, ** refers to statistical significance at the 5% level 
and * refers to statistical significance at the 10% level.  
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Performance Following Activism
We now proceed to investigate the principal 
question of whether hedge fund involvement 
causes improvements in shareholder wealth. 
Figures 2 through 4 present our results. Figures 
2 and 3 show the change in shareholder returns 
over different time periods before and after the 
hedge fund engagement. Importantly, Figure 4 
shows the change in shareholder returns for the 
targeted group of firms relative to the control 
group. The results are broken down per 
engagement outcome: 
a) All Announced interventions, 
b) Completed interventions where the hedge 
fund disposed of its investment in the target 
company and the outcome was either that the 
demands of the hedge fund activist were 
partially or fully met or that the company’s 
management was able to avoid implementing 
the proposed changes,  
c) HF Victory where the hedge fund’s demands 
were partially or fully met, and  
d) Management Victory where the company’s 
management was able to avoid implementing 
the proposed changes.  
Abnormal returns are calculated relative to 
each company’s market index. 
Figure 2 shows that the targets of hedge fund 
activists tend to underperform during the period 
before the engagement announcement. This is 
evidenced by the significantly negative 
shareholder returns calculated during periods 
spanning (-36m, -1m), (-24m, -1m), and (-12m, 
-1m) months before hedge fund involvement. 
For example, we find that the target firms of all 
announced engagements significantly 
underperform their index, by 11.8% 
respectively, over the period starting 24 months 
before and ending one month before the hedge 
fund’s engagement. These results confirm the 
idea that hedge fund activists target companies 
which have been underperforming their peers. 
Furthermore, we observe in Figure 3 that the 
returns generated following the activists’ 
intervention tend to be either significantly 
positive or at least not negative. For example, 
targets of Completed engagements outperform 
their index by 4.6% over the 25-month period 
starting one month before the hedge fund’s 
intervention. In addition, the targets of hedge 
funds that succeed in implementing their 
proposed changes, the HF Victory outcome in 
Figure 3, outperform their index by 4.1% in the 
25-month period starting one month before the 
hedge fund’s intervention. At face value these 
findings indicate that improvements in 
shareholder wealth creation accompany 
interventions of hedge fund activists. However, 
in order to infer causation from hedge fund 
activism to shareholder wealth creation it is 
necessary to examine target performance 
relative to an appropriate control group of firms.   
Figure 4 shows this analysis. Most of the hedge 
fund targets either significantly underperform 
similar non target firms or generate returns 
which are not significantly different from the 
comparable group. These results are consistent 
across different types of outcomes (i.e. 
irrespective of whether the hedge fund 
succeeds or not) and different time horizons. 
For example, the targets of completed hedge 
fund campaigns underperform their comparable 
group by 22.6%, 30.9%, and 38.3% over the  
37-, 49-, and 61-month time windows following 
intervention. Considering the different types of 
engagements, we observe that interventions 
which involve changes in company governance 
or restructuring of the business underperform 
by 23.3% (23.7%) and 67.9% (11.8%) 
respectively during the 49- (61-) month period 
following the activist engagement. What is 
more, we see that although the targets of hedge 
fund activists underperform in the period before 
the activists’ involvement, the degree of 
underperformance worsens following the 
activists’ intervention. This is particularly the 
case over the longer, (-1m, +24m), (-1m, 
+36m), (-1m, +48m), and (-1m, + 60m) time 
windows. These results demonstrate that 
companies which become the targets of hedge 
fund activists are truly different from their peers 
that do not, and it is this difference that causes 
the improvements in shareholder wealth 
creation rather than the hedge fund activism per 
se.  
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Performance per type of engagement 
Our results are largely confirmed when we 
breakdown the analysis of the long-term wealth 
effects of hedge fund activism per type of 
engagement. The results are summarized in 
Figure 5. We distinguish between four broad 
categories of engagement:  
a) Strategic Direction, i.e. the activist is 
challenging the status quo of the firm without 
proposing any specific guidelines on how to 
achieve the change,  
b) Governance, i.e. the activist proposes 
changes at the board or senior management 
level as well as other changes that involve 
increasing the influence of shareholders,  
c) Restructuring, i.e. performing a spin-off, 
partial or full sale of the company’s assets. All 
returns are adjusted to the respective market 
index of each company,  
d) Other, i.e. changes that do not fit into any of 
the above categories. 
In most cases presented in Figure 5, the long-
term performance of hedge fund targets is 
either significantly worse or not significantly 
different from the performance of similar 
companies that were not targeted by hedge 
fund activists. For example, engagements 
related to Governance or Restructuring 
changes significantly underperform similar 
firms by 23.7% and 11.8% respectively over the 
period starting one month before and ending 60 
months after the announcement of the 
engagement.  
Possible Explanations 
Our results suggest that the shareholder wealth 
improvement experienced by the targets of 
hedge fund activism (that is documented by 
previous studies) is not caused by the hedge 
fund intervention per se. Instead, it merely 
demonstrates the activists’ ability to choose 
companies whose shareholder wealth is 
expected to improve in any event. We conclude 
that the observed wealth creation is evidence of 
the hedge fund’s ‘stock picking’ skills rather 
than their ability to contribute to long-term value 
creation by inducing companies to implement 
proposed changes.  
What is more, our results show that, when 
compared to the performance of companies 
with similar characteristics, the activist targets 
appear to perform worse. These findings 
indicate that the hedge funds’ engagement 
exerts a detrimental effect on company 
management by either disturbing the normal 
operations of the business or proposing 
changes that are not appropriate given the 
specific circumstances/characteristics of the 
targets. 
Practitioner Implications 
For corporates: Given the potential negative 
impact of hedge fund engagement on company 
value we recommend a proactive strategy to 
dealing with activists. Such a strategy could 
involve regular discussions of the potential risk 
of being targeted by an activist at the board 
level in order to raise awareness. In addition, 
effective and clear communication with the 
capital markets is key. Companies should make 
sure that their current strategies to generate 
value and the financial policies that accompany 
these strategies are comprehensively 
conveyed to company shareholders. 
For regulators: Our analysis carries important 
implications for a number of ongoing policy 
debates. Specifically, our findings are relevant 
to policy discussions around determining: 
a) shareholders’ influence vis-à-vis boards of 
directors,  
b) shareholders’ power to replace directors,  
c) the rights of short-term investors,  
d) the disclosure requirements associated with 
stock acquisitions by hedge fund activists, and  
e) the degree to which boards of directors 
should accommodate the preferences of 
activists. Policymakers should consider the fact 
that activist interventions could be detrimental 
to shareholder wealth when defining the ‘rules 
of engagement’ between companies and hedge 
fund activists. 
For hedge funds activists: Our results suggest 
that activists should stick to stock picking and 
place less emphasis on trying to encourage 
companies to change. According to our 
analysis a ‘silent’ strategy of selecting targets 
could increase the returns that hedge funds 
generate.
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Figure 2: Target Performance before Hedge Fund Activism 
 
Figure 3: Target Performance following Hedge Fund Activism 
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Figure 2 presents the performance of targets before hedge fund intervention. The sample is broken down per type of engagement outcome as follows: a) All Announced 
interventions, b) Completed interventions where the hedge fund disposed of its investment in the target company and the outcome was either that the demands of the hedge fund 
activist were partially or fully met or that the company’s management was able to avoid implementing the proposed changes, c) HF Victory where the hedge fund’s demands were 
partially or fully met, and d) Management Victory where the company’s management was able to avoid implementing the proposed changes. Abnormal returns are calculated 
relative to each company’s market index. In addition, Figure 3 presents the performance of the targets following hedge fund interventions. The returns have been calculated on 
the basis of the Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) methodology. BHAR are adjusted to each company’s respective market index. We consider five different event windows: 
a) 13-month, b) 25-month, c) 37-month, d) 49-month and e) 61-month. Please refer to the Data and Methodology section of this report for a detailed description of the methodology 
of this study. Statistically significant returns are delineated in squares with bold font. The sample consists of 1, 750 hedge fund engagements globally announced between January 
2000 and December 2014. 
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Figure 4: Target Performance following Hedge Fund Activism Relative to Comparable Firms: Breakdown per Engagement Outcome 
 
Figure 5: Target Performance following Hedge Fund Activism Relative to Comparable Firms: Breakdown per Engagement Type 
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Figure 4 presents the performance of targets following hedge fund interventions relative to a comparable group of firms that were not targeted by activists. The sample is broken 
down per type of engagement outcome as follows: a) All Announced interventions, b) Completed interventions where the hedge fund disposed of its investment in the target 
company and the outcome was either that the demands of the hedge fund activist were partially or fully met or that the company’s management was able to avoid implementing 
the proposed changes, c) HF Victory where the hedge fund’s demands were partially or fully met, and d) Management Victory where the company’s management was able to 
avoid implementing the proposed changes. Abnormal returns are calculated relative to each company’s market index. In addition, Figure 5 presents the performance of the targets 
following hedge fund interventions relative to a comparable group of firms that were not targeted by activists. a) Strategic Direction, i.e. the activist is challenging the status quo 
of the firm without proposing any specific guidelines on how to achieve the change, b) Governance, i.e. the activist proposes changes at the board or senior management level 
as well as other changes that involve increasing the influence of shareholders, c) Restructuring, i.e. performing a spin-off, partial or full sale of the company’s assets. All returns 
are adjusted to the respective market index of each company. The returns have been calculated on the basis of the Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) methodology. BHAR 
are adjusted to each company’s respective market index. We consider five different event windows: a) 13-month, b) 25-month, c) 37-month, d) 49-month and e) 61-month. Please 
refer to the Data and Methodology section of this report for a detailed description of the methodology of this study. Statistically significant returns are delineated in squares with 
bold font. The sample consists of 1, 750 hedge fund engagements globally announced between January 2000 and December 2014. 
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Appendix 1: Notes on Methodology
To perform the analysis in this study we 
construct an international database of 
exchange-listed targets of hedge fund activism 
which covers all engagements announced in 
the period January 2000 – December 2014. Our 
sample of hedge fund engagements is obtained 
from a number of different sources. First, we 
identify US hedge fund involvements by looking 
at Schedule 13D filings to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). This type of 
filing is a legal requirement for any investor who 
holds 5% or more of a firm’s shares and who 
intends to impact corporate control. We merge 
this database with the data provided by 
Thomson One Banker on activist interventions.  
To identify the purpose of each hedge fund 
engagement we examine the 13D filings and 
other filings provided by Thomson One Banker. 
We also perform news searches to substantiate 
and complement the data obtained from 
company filings where necessary. Our final 
sample consists of 1,750 activist interventions. 
The top three countries with highest number of 
interventions in our sample are the US (1,465), 
United Kingdom (94), and Canada (81) and 
taken together these countries account for 
approximately 94% of the interventions in our 
sample.  
Measures of post activist engagement 
performance 
We measure performance on the basis of 
company share price returns using the buy-
and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) which 
accrue to companies over different event 
windows such as (+1m, +12m), (+1m, +24m), 
(+1m, +36m), (+1m, +48m), and (+1m, 
+60m).19 The BHAR approach to measuring 
abnormal returns has been widely used in 
                                                          
19 Note that the BHAR analysis uses the total 
returns of a company, i.e. it includes share price 
appreciation or depreciation as well as the return 
from reinvesting the paid dividends. 
20 Barber, B. and Lyon, J., ‘Detecting Long-run 
Abnormal Stock Returns: The empirical power and 
specification of test statistics’, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol.43, 1997, pp. 341-72. 
studies involving share price performance.20 
BHAR can be defined as “the average multiyear 
return from a strategy of investing in all firms 
that complete an event and selling at the end of 
a pre-specified holding period versus a 
comparable strategy using otherwise similar 
non-event firms.”21 An advantage of using 
BHAR is that this approach to measuring 
company share price performance is closer to 
investors’ actual investment experience 
compared to the periodic rebalancing which 
other approaches to share price performance 
analysis involve. The BHARs are equally 
weighted and adjusted to the performance of 
the respective Datastream local index or MSCI 
industry index of each company over the same 
period.  
Identifying a group of comparable 
companies  
We use the Abadie and Imbens (2006) 
matching technique to evaluate the ‘average 
treatment effect’ from becoming the target of an 
activist intervention, i.e. the effect of the hedge 
fund’s involvement on subsequent 
performance.22 This matching procedure is 
superior to the other methods since it does not 
involve any parametric assumptions regarding 
the distributions of the variables. Relaxing such 
assumptions is particularly important when 
using income and balance-sheet statement 
items because the distribution of these line 
items is not accurately captured by the logistic 
or normal distributions which are the two 
distributions used by other matching 
techniques. Please refer to Figure 6 for detailed 
definitions of all the variables included in our 
probability models. 
21 Mitchell, M. and Stafford, E., ‘Managerial 
Decisions and Long-term Stock Price – 
performance’, Journal of Business, Vol.73, No.3, 
2000, pp. 287-329. 
22 Abadie, A. and Imbens, G., ‘Large Sample 
Properties of Matching Estimators for Average 
Treatment Effects,’ Econometrica, 75, 2006, 235–
267. 
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Figure 6: Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Definition 
Total return (3-year) 
The geometric growth rate in the total return index of each company during the 3-year period before activist 
intervention 
Net debt to market cap The ratio of net debt to market capitalisation 
Return on capital employed 
(Net Income – Bottom Line + ((Interest Expense on Debt - Interest Capitalized) * (1-Tax Rate))) / Average of Last 
Year's and Current Year’s (Total Capital + Short Term Debt & Current Portion of Long Term Debt) * 100 
Undervaluation The percentage difference between actual share price and the average analyst target price 
Forward P/E ratio 
SUM (IBNOSH * IBP) / SUM (F1FD12 * IBNOSH) 
Where: F1FD12 = 12 Month Forward EPS Earnings Per Share 
IBNOSH = Number of Shares Outstanding 
IBP = Closing Price 
Earnings surprise The earning per share outcome for each company relative to analyst consensus estimates 
Sales growth (3-year) The geometric growth rate in net sales of each company during the 3-year period before activist intervention 
Capex to sales The ratio of capital expenditures to sales 
Dividend yield Expresses the dividend per share as a percentage of the share price 
Price to free cash flow The ratio of share price to the cash earnings per share, net of capital expenditures and total dividends paid  
Market to book The ratio of company market value to company book value 
Cash to total assets The ratio of cash and short-term investments divided by total assets 
Market cap. Market capitalisation 
R&D to sales The ratio of Research and Development expenses to sales 
Closely Held Shares Percentage of shares owned by company insiders 
Share turnover Share volume divided by adjusted shares outstanding 
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Appendix 2: Matching Target to Non-target Firms
The central question addressed by this report 
is: Would the target company’s performance 
have improved without the hedge fund’s 
involvement? To answer this question we 
estimate the average treatment effect of being 
targeted by a hedge fund activist. If the process 
of target allocation to hedge fund activism is 
exogenous, i.e. contingent upon a group of 
observable company characteristics, the 
treatment effect can be evaluated by building a 
control sample of non-target companies and 
then by averaging the differences in 
performance that take place between the target 
(treatment) and non-target (control) 
subsamples.  
We use a recent econometric development in 
the analysis of average treatment effects 
created by Abadie and Imbens (2006). This 
matching procedure is arguably superior owing 
to the fact that it corrects for the presence of 
asymptotic bias in simpler matching procedures 
such as the propensity score matching 
methodology developed by Dahejia and Wahba 
(1999, 2002). This bias arises when the treated 
and control subsamples are not sufficiently 
comparable, i.e. the distributions of control 
variables (hedge fund target characteristics) of 
the treated and control subsamples are 
different.  
The general set up  
We discuss the general problem of obtaining 
consistent treatment effects estimates here. Let 
T be a variable which takes the value of one if 
a company is targeted by an activist hedge fund 
and zero otherwise. Let 𝑆𝑛(𝑇) be the level of the 
share price or total returns index as a function 
of T for observation n. Using this notation, 
𝐸(𝑆𝑛(1)| 𝑇 = 1) represent the expected effect 
of being targeted by a hedge fund activist (the 
treatment) on the group of hedge fund targets 
(treated group). Likewise, 𝐸(𝑆𝑛(0)| 𝑇 = 1) 
represents the ‘counterfactual’ expected effect 
of not being targeted by a hedge fund activist, 
given that the firm experienced hedge fund 
involvement (i.e. treatment took place). In our 
analysis we examine the change in 𝑆𝑛(𝑇) 
relative to its level before the hedge fund 
involvement, which is denoted as ∆𝑆𝑛(𝑇). By 
taking the change in the share price or total 
returns index we are able to control for time-
invariant and unobservable differences 
between the target (treatment) and non-target 
(control) subsamples. This procedure is similar 
to differencing to remove fixed effects in a panel 
dataset. We estimate the average impact of 
becoming an activist target on company 
performance for a group of companies that 
were targeted by activist hedge funds, i.e. the 
average treatment impact on the treated: 
θ|𝑇=1 ≡ 𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(1) − ∆𝑆𝑛(0)|𝑇 = 1 (1) 
Since we cannot directly measure the effect of 
both being targeted by an activist hedge fund 
and not being targeted by a hedge fund on the 
same company, 𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(0)| 𝑇 = 1) represents a 
hypothetical event that cannot be observed. 
The recent studies on the impact of hedge fund 
activism on company performance have 
measured: 
𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(1)| 𝑇 = 1)   (2) 
By averaging the difference in share price or 
total return index for targeted companies before 
and after hedge fund involvement. The problem 
with this method is that equation (2) is a biased 
estimator of equation (1), in any case apart from 
when 𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(0)| 𝑇 = 1) = 0. The latter situation 
would happen if the companies that were 
targeted by hedge funds would not have 
experienced any change in performance in the 
absence of the activist’s involvement. This 
condition would only be true if hedge fund 
involvement is the sole way to enhance share 
price performance or if the targeted companies 
have no other characteristics that impact share 
price performance. The first requirement is 
false and the second one is a matter that can 
be determined empirically.  
Since we cannot observe θ|𝑇=1 we need to 
make certain assumptions in order to estimate 
the unobservable part of the function: 
𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(0)| 𝑇 = 1). The typical assumption in the 
treatment effects literature is that allocation to 
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treatment is random, dependent on a group of 
observable pre-treatment characteristics (i.e. 
observable variables that distinguish between 
hedge fund targets and non-targets), Z. Simple 
matching procedures use this assumption by 
assigning each treated observation to one or 
more untreated observations with similar pre-
treatment characteristics, Z. Then, 
𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(0)| 𝑇 = 1) is estimated by taking the 
average of ∆𝑆𝑛(0) over the matches (control 
subsample). This makes it possible to obtain an 
estimate of θ|𝑇=1 by taking the difference 
between ∆𝑆𝑛(1) and estimate of 𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(0)| 𝑇 =
1).  
How our methodology differs 
There are two important differences between 
the simple matching procedures described 
above and the Abadie and Imbens (2006) 
procedure which are related to the fact that 
simple matching estimators are asymptotically 
biased when the vector of company 
characteristics Z contains more than one 
variable. When the matches of treated and non-
treated observations are not exact the 
treatment effects estimator is asymptotically 
biased.  
The first difference is the introduction of 
matching with replacement in order to minimise 
the asymptotic bias and the second difference 
is the estimation of a term that corrects for the 
bias. The bias correction is only necessary for 
the estimate of 𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(0)| 𝑇 = 1) as the term 
𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(1)| 𝑇 = 1) can be observed directly. The 
bias correction is an estimate of the difference 
between two components. The first component 
is the impact of treatment on the control 
subsample with perfect matching.  
The second component is the actual impact of 
treatment on the control subsample. To obtain 
these two terms it is necessary to estimate the 
conditional expectation of ∆𝑆𝑛(0) given 𝑍𝑛 
which is given by regressing ∆𝑆𝑛(0) on 𝑍𝑛 on 
the basis of the control subsample. To estimate 
the conditional expectation we need to take 
𝜔0̂(𝑍𝑛) ≡ 𝛽0̂ + 𝛽1̂𝑍𝑛, where 𝛽0̂, s scalar, and 𝛽1̂, 
a vector with the same dimension as 𝑍𝑛, are the 
estimated coefficients from the regression. The 
bias corrected estimate of 𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(1)| 𝑇 = 1) is 
equal to the simple regression estimate 
presented above plus a component which we 
denote as 𝜔0̂(𝑍𝑛) − 𝜔0̂(𝑍𝑖). This component is 
defined as the difference between the predicted 
values of ∆𝑆𝑛(0) using a group of controls for 
the nth treated observation and the group of 
controls for its associated match, indexed by i. 
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